Page 21 - Paracelsus Three Books of Philosophy

evil. Which otherwise would be, if one should oppose another. Those have no
knowledge or judgment in whom the eternal dwells not. But those things in whom the
eternal is, cannot be destitute of understanding. When things so fell at odds as to clash
one with another, one eternal was forced to give an account and make satisfaction of
wrongs to another. And whereas recompense belongs to the eternal, it must not be
repaid by that which is mortal. And though bodies may pacify and bear with one
another; yet if any thing be left here, that is eternal. Therefore that only is judged that
is eternal in us. And though one exact upon or judge another, yet all mortal things,
which have the eternal in them, must die whether they will or no, so that the eternal
only shall stay behind here, without company of the body. Thus the judgment is
finished. For that only is eternal, nor is there any more of it to come in the last
destruction of every mortal thing. Now if those things, that had the eternal in them,
have so perished, nothing now remains but what was eternal of itself, and did nourish
and increase that which was mortal. That which is good for nothing doth not tarry in
the creature. All other things are only for the sake of that which is eternal. Hence also
it is that which hath the eternal in itself, and with it all things that maintained it, may die
and perish together. That only remains that is eternal. Whence the end of all bodily
things is evident, even nothing, to which they all revolt. For they are separated from
their own essence into nothing, that is, from something, into nothing. But man desires a
perfect separation, i.e. of the eternal from the mortal. Now is the judgment, when the
fickleness of all things under heaven is proclaimed. If there were no reason why a thing
should be fragile, the creature should never die, no death should be in it, but all things
would be eternal. The only reason whereof is this, because we mortals live not in
righteousness, we judge not right judgment among our selves one toward another, nor
have we received the power of the eternal to judge. These things belong to the eternal.
Which seeing it ought to be so, all we must of necessity be brought and come together.
Thus have we found the dissolution of all things.

Seeing then that all things were created and have their end also out of the first
Great Mystery, as hath been said, it is evident by consequence that there is some Great
Mystery. Which is no other than as if a house should be built by (the command of) a
word. Understand it thus, that it [the Mystery] applied itself to the sole Supreme; so it
is possible that a man may bring fire out of that which is not fire, where no fire is. A
flint hath no fire in itself, though fire come out of it. Know therefore, that all the first
mysteries lie hid and did exist in the Great Mystery in a threefold manner; in respect of
things vegetable, elementary, and sensible. The vegetables were many hundreds, many
thousands. Every thing had its own special kind in the Great Mystery. To the elements
did there but four belong, for they had but four principles. But men had six hundred.

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